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Summary: This article examines the two cases brought before the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights following the Libyan 
uprising in 2011: African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(Benghazi) v Libya and African Commission (Saif al-Islam Gaddafi) v 
Libya. These two cases mark three ‘firsts’: the first time for the African 
Commission to transfer a case to the African Court; the first order for 
provisional measures by the Court; and the first time the Court rendered 
a judgment by default. This study reveals that although the Court has 
taken significant steps in terms of its consolidation and legitimation, 
substantive and procedural challenges in its functioning remain. 
Moreover, the authors argue that the political divisions within the African 
Union diminished the Court’s potential impact on the Libyan crisis. 
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1 Introduction
In 1981 the African regional human rights system was established 
under the auspices of the predecessor to the African Union (AU), 
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), through the adoption of 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter). 
However, the system did not include the creation of a judicial body. 
It took African leaders 17 years to agree on the creation of the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Court), when the AU 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government in 1998 adopted the 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 
the Establishment of an African Court (African Court Protocol). Since 
then, things initially moved slowly. The Court Protocol entered into 
force in 2004, its first judges were elected in 2006 and only in 2008 
did the Court adopt its Rules of Procedure. 
After having adopted only a few decisions, and even prior 
to issuing a judgment on the merits of a case, the African Court 
had to deal with the dramatic situation that emerged in Libya 
after a mass civilian uprising. This uprising – against the dictator 
Muammar Gaddafi – started in Tunisia, later on emerged in Egypt, 
and in February 2011 spread to Libya. In this context, two cases of 
paramount importance to the development of the African Court’s 
jurisprudence were brought before the Court. The first is the case 
of African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Benghazi) v 
Libya, which has to be contextualised at the very beginning of the 
Libyan uprising when the Gaddafi regime used disproportionate and 
lethal force against protesters.1 The second case, African Commission 
(Saif al-Islam Gaddafi) v Libya, is imbedded in the chaotic situation 
that followed the 2011 Libyan civil war, during which a rebel militia 
captured and detained the second son of Gaddafi, Saif al-Islam 
Gaddafi.2 
1 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Benghazi) v Libya App 4/2011 
25 March 2011 (Order for Provisional Measures), (2011) 1 AfCLR 17; http://
www.worldcourts.com/acthpr/eng/decisions/2013.03.15_ACmHPR_v_Libya_2.
pdf (accessed 27 April 2018).
2 African Commission (Saif al-Islam Gaddafi) v Libya App 2/2013 15 March 2013 
(Order for Provisional Measures), (2013) 1 AfCLR 145: http://en.african-court.
org/index.php/55-finalised-cases-details/856-app-no-002-2013-the-african-
commission-on-human-and-peoples-rights-v-libya-detals (accessed 27 April 
2018).
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These two cases represent a turning point in the consolidation 
and legitimation of the African Court. However, some legal and 
political issues still represent key challenges in this process. For 
the purpose of this article, the notion of ‘consolidation’ and 
‘legitimation’ is clarified: By consolidation, the article refers to the 
ability of the Court to become consistent and effective in its role 
of delivering judgments. The notion of legitimation or legitimacy 
could be defined according to different approaches. The first is the 
empirical or sociological approach, which inquires whether a court 
or institution is perceived as legitimate by relevant constituencies.3 
The second is the normative approach, which analyses whether the 
court or institution possesses justified authority in terms of law or 
expertise.4 According to Land, ‘[a]lthough empirical and normative 
approaches to legitimacy are different … they are complementary 
because normative and sociological legitimacy can be understood as 
different ways to measure justified authority’.5 For these reasonsthe 
article acknowledges both conceptions of legitimacy and legitimation 
in order to assess the jurisprudence of the African Court. 
The article analyses the two cases taking into consideration their 
procedural background and the decision on the merits (part 2). In 
this regard, the article examines the shortfalls and successes of these 
cases and the way in which the African Court handled them (part 
3). This part specifically considers the legal and political issues that 
deserve the attention of the Court. Moreover, the article provides 
lessons learned and recommendations for the future work of the 
Court (part 4). The last part presents some concluding remarks.
3 Y Shany Assessing the effectiveness of international courts (2014) 138. 
4 D Bodansky ‘The concept of legitimacy in international law’ in R Wolfrum & 
V Röben (eds) Legitimacy in international law (2008) 313; R Wolfrum ‘Legitimacy 
in international law from a legal perspective: Some introductory considerations’ 
in R Wolfrum & V Röben (eds) Legitimacy in international law 6. 
5 MK Land ‘Justice as legitimacy in the European Court of Human Rights’ in 
N Grossman, HG Cohen, A Follesdal & G Ulfstein Legitimacy and international 
courts (2018) 85. See also M Loth ‘Courts in a quest for legitimacy: A comparative 
approach’ in N Huls, J Bomhoff & M Adams (eds) The legitimacy of highest courts’ 
rulings: Judicial deliberations and beyond (2009) 268-269.
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2 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(Benghazi) v Libya 
2.1 Order for provisional measures
The mass civilian uprising that started in Tunisia6 and later appeared 
in Egypt7 spread to Libya in February 2011 against the dictator 
Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi who came to power 
following a coup d’état in 1969.8 This civilian uprising turned into 
an armed conflict, with the Libyan government reacting by using 
lethal and disproportionate force against protesters in violation of 
international humanitarian and human rights law. At the end of that 
month a body of anti-Gaddafi forces, the National Transitional Council 
(NTC), was established to act as the ‘political face of the revolution’.9 
The situation escalated to such an extent that some weeks later the 
United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 
1973 (2011) authorising ‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians, 
imposing a no-fly zone over Libya10 and legitimising the subsequent 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military intervention.11 
According to the analyst Bhardwaj: 12 
Gaddafi’s harsh and repressive regime, territorial division of Libya into 
NTC and loyalist strongholds, coalition rebel forces, along with the 
influence of the UN, NATO intervention and the Arab League, jointly 
propelled Libya’s conflict inexorably from peaceful protest to bloody 
civil war. 
6 In this regard, see eg M Khan & K Mezran ‘Tunisia: The last Arab Spring country’ 
(2015) Rafik Hariri Centre For The Middle East, Atlantic Council 1-12. 
7 See, eg, T Povey ‘The Arab Spring in Egypt: Revolution and beyond’ (2013) 25 
Journal of African Cultural Studies 364-366. 
8 In this regard, see eg E Oliveri ‘Libya before and after Gaddafi: An international 
law analysis’, PhD thesis, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, 2012. 
9 RB St John Libya: Continuity and change (2015) 364. 
10 UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) 6498th meeting 17 March 2011, 
https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/s/res/1973-%282011%29 (accessed 27 April 
2020). 
11 It is worth mentioning that five days before the adoption of Resolution 
1973 (2011), the Arab league called on the UN Security Council ‘to bear 
its responsibilities towards the deteriorating situation in Libya, and to take 
the necessary measures to impose immediately a no-fly zone on Libyan 
military aviation’. See Decision of the Council of the League of Arab States 
on 12  March  2011, http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/Arab%20League%20
Ministerial%20level%20statement%2012%20march%202011%20-%20
english(1).pdf (accessed 27 April 2020). On the role of the Arab League after the 
Libyan uprising, see eg R Alaaldin ‘The role and impact on the Arab League’ in 
D Henriksen & AK Larssen (ed) Political rationale and international consequences 
of the war in Libya (2016). 
12 M Bhardwaj ‘Development of conflict in Arab Spring Libya and Syria: From 
revolution to civil war’ (2012) 1 Washington University Law Review 81. 
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Unlike the Arab League, which asked the UNSC to impose a no-
flight zone over Libya and decided to suspend its membership, the 
AU played a secondary role in order to solve the Libyan crisis, largely 
because of the political division among AU member states. Initially, 
the AU Peace and Security Council of the AU (PSC) established a 
High‐Level Ad Hoc Committee on Libya13 and proposed a road 
map as a solution to the crisis,14 which was rejected by both the 
Gaddafi government and the NTC.15 As a result of the NATO 
military intervention, the AU remained paralysed and, therefore, 
marginalised in the management of the conflict. In particular, the 
AU had to face the dilemma of not undermining Libya’s sovereignty 
and supporting the Gaddafi regime – one of the main drivers of the 
continental organisation – or protecting the civilian population from 
mass atrocities as provided for in article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act 
of the AU.16 
Even though the AU political institutions have remained paralysed, 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African 
Commission) and the African Court have played a significant role 
following the Libyan uprising. In this regard, on 24 February 2011 
three non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (Human Rights 
Watch, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and INTERIGHTS) 
jointly submitted an application to the African Commission requesting 
the adoption of provisional measures in order to stop and prevent 
13 The Committee was composed of the Heads of State and Government of 
Mauritania, Mali, South Africa, Uganda and Congo, alongside the AU Commission 
Chairperson. In this regard, see D Kuwali ‘From stopping to preventing atrocities. 
Actualisation of article 4(h)’ (2015) 1 African Security Review 260. 
14 The roadmap consisted of a five-point plan of which objectives were ‘the 
protection of civilians and the cessation of hostilities; the humanitarian assistance 
to affected populations both Libyans and foreign migrant workers, particularly 
those from Africa; the initiation of political dialogue between the Libyan parties 
in order to reach an agreement on the modalities for ending the crisis; the 
establishment and management of an inclusive transitional period; the adoption 
and implementation of political reforms necessary to meet the aspirations of 
the Libyan people’. See C Ekwealor & U Okeke-Uzodike ‘The African Union 
interventions in African conflicts: Unity and leadership conundrum on Libya’ 
(2016) 5 Journal of African Union Studies 69. 
15 A Abass ‘The African Union’s response to the Libyan crisis: A plea for objectivity’ 
(2014) 7 African Journal of Legal Studies 137. 
16 As an example of such paralysis and political division, despite the fact that three 
African states – Gabon, Nigeria and South Africa – voted in favour of UNSC 
Resolution 1973 (2011), various AU organs later spoke out against a foreign 
military intervention in Libya. In this regard, according to a significant number 
of authors ‘the AU should have participated in the implementation of the 
responsibility to protect the civilian population from mass atrocities, including 
support for the implementation of a no-fly zone … the inaction of the AU 
Assembly regarding Libya illustrates the tense and potentially-contradictory 
relationship between what is stated in article 4(h) and political factors (realpolitik 
considerations)’. See J Perez Leon Acevedo ‘Stopping mass atrocities in Africa 
and the Pretoria Principles: Triggering military intervention in Darfur (Sudan) 
and Libya under article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union’ (2016) 
16 African Human Rights Law Journal 498.
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the use of unjustified lethal force against protesters; to allow people 
in Libya to air their grievances through peaceful protests; and to 
undertake a thorough, impartial and prompt investigation in order 
to hold accountable those responsible for these violations, among 
other demands.17
However, the African Commission did not order the provisional 
measures requested,18 but instead transferred the case to the African 
Court alleging ‘serious and massive violation of human rights 
guaranteed under the African Charter’.19 In addition, the African 
Commission adopted a resolution calling on the responsibility of 
the AU, the PSC and the international community ‘to take all the 
necessary political and legal measures for the protection of the 
Libyan population and for the establishment of genuine democratic 
governance in the State Party’.20 
Nine days after having received such application, the African Court, 
for the very first time, granted an order for provisional measures 
taking into consideration the gravity and urgency of the matter.21 
The order was not adopted at the request of the Commission but by 
the African Court proprio motu.22 In its decision the judicial institution 
17 J Oder ‘The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ order in respect of 
the situation in Libya: A watershed in the regional protection of human rights?’ 
(2011) 11 African Human Rights Law Journal 497. A second application was 
submitted to the Commission by two NGOs (the Libyan League for Human 
Rights and the International Federation of Human Rights) requesting to refer 
such application to the African Court ‘considering that the situation brought to 
its knowledge amounts to serious and massive violations of human rights and 
that Libya is a state party to the Protocol to the African Charter regarding the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’; see Oder (above) 497. 
18 The African Commission decided not to order provisional measures due to the 
fact that ‘the chances of such request eliciting a response from the government 
[were] very slim taking into consideration the situation in Libya’; Oder (n 17) 
498. On the other hand, it is worth mentioning that the Libyan state ratified the 
Court Protocol in 2003. Nonetheless, it has not made the necessary declaration 
allowing NGOs and individuals direct access before the Court. For this reason, 
both cases regarding Libya – the only cases that have been heard to date by the 
Court concerning Arab African countries – were transferred by the Commission 
to the African Court. 
19 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Benghazi) v Libya App 4/2011 
25 March 2011 (Order for Provisional Measures), http://www.worldcourts.com/
acthpr/eng/decisions/2013.03.15_ACmHPR_v_Libya_2.pdf (accessed 27 April 
2020).
20 Resolution on the Human Rights Situation in the Great Socialist Peoples’ Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya, ACHPR/RES.181(EXT.OS/IX) March 2011, http://www.refworld.
org/docid/4d8863f82.html (accessed 27 April 2020).
21 Resolution (n 20) para 8. In this regard it is worth mentioning that, as noted 
earlier, pursuant to art 27(2) of the Court Protocol ‘in cases of extreme gravity 
and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable harm to persons, the 
Court shall adopt such provisional measures as it deems necessary’. 
22 When submitting the application the Commission alleged ‘(1) that following the 
detention of an opposition lawyer, peaceful demonstrations took place on the 
16th of February 2011 in the Eastern Libyan city of Benghazi; (2) that on the 
19th of February 2011, there were other demonstrations in Benghazi, A1 Baida, 
Ajdabiya, Zayiwa and Derna, which were violently suppressed by security forces 
(2020) 20 AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW JOURNAL84
considered whether it had jurisdiction to order such interim measures. 
The Court concluded that it had such jurisdiction23 because, first, 
Libya had ratified the African Charter and the Court Protocol24 and, 
second, the Commission is one of the parties entitled to submit cases 
to the Court without the need for the special declaration provided 
for in articles 5(3) and 34(6) of the Protocol.25
The Court subsequently turned to consider whether there were 
suitable conditions – namely, ‘cases of extreme gravity and urgency, 
and when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons’26 – for 
the Court to adopt provisional measures. In this respect, the African 
Court, relying on the 23 February 2011 Resolution of the Peace and 
Security Council of the AU,27 the 21 February 2011 Resolution of the 
Arab League,28 and UN Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011),29 
noted that such circumstances were present in the case at issue and 
decided to grant an order for provisional measures against Libya.30 
2.2 Decision on merits 
Due to the fact that the African Commission, acting as prosecutor, 
was not able to continue investigating the situation and collecting 
the necessary testimony and evidence, the African Court decided 
who opened fire at random on the demonstrators killing and injuring many 
people; (3) that hospital sources reported that on the 20 of February 2011 they 
received individuals who had died or been injured with bullet wounds in the 
chest, neck and head; (4) that Libyan security forces engaged in excessive use 
of heavy weapons and machine guns against the population, including targeted 
aerial bombardment and all types of attacks; and (5) that these amount to 
serious violations of the right to life and to the integrity of persons, freedom of 
expression, demonstration and assembly’. Taking all this into consideration the 
Commission concluded ‘that these actions amount to serious and widespread 
violations of the rights enshrined in Articles 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 11, 12, 13 and 23 of 
the Charter’. Resolution (n 20) para 2. 
23 Order for Provisional Measures (n 19) para 19. 
24 Order for Provisional Measures paras 16-17. 
25 Order for Provisional Measures para 18.
26 African Court Protocol, art 27(2).
27 AU Peace and Security Council, Communiqué, Peace and Security Council, 
261st meeting, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, PSC/PR/COMM (CCLXI) 23 February 
2011, http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-communique-on-the-situation-in-
libya.pdf (accessed 27 April 2020).
28 In the resolution the Arab League requested ‘an end to violence, stating that 
the demands of Arab people for change are legitimate’. See Resolution on the 
Human Rights Situation in the Great Socialist Peoples’ Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (n 
20) para 21.
29 UN Security Council Resolution 1970, 6491st meeting, 26 February 2011, http://
www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1970%20%282011%29 
(accessed 27 April 2020). By such resolution the UNSC ‘decided to refer the 
situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya since 15 February 2011 to the Prosecutor 
of the International Criminal Court’. 
30 Resolution (n 20) para 21.
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to strike out the application.31 Notwithstanding this, as will be 
discussed in the next part, both the opening of the proceeding and 
the provisional measures ordered have been significant in terms of 
the Court’s consolidation and legitimation.32 
3 African Commission (Saif al-Islam Gaddafi) v Libya 
3.1 Order for provisional measures 
Some weeks after the death of Muammar Gaddafi, his second 
son and former de facto Prime Minister, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, was 
detained by a rebel militia based in the Libyan city of Zintan. On 
2 April 2012 the African Commission received a complaint on his 
behalf alleging that Saif al-Islam Gaddafi had been detained in an 
unknown location without access to his family or to a lawyer and 
that he had not been brought before a court.33 According to the 
complaint, these acts constituted a violation of article 6 (the right 
to personal liberty and protection from arbitrary arrest) and article 7 
(the right to a fair trial) of the African Charter. 
In January 2013 the Commission submitted the case to the African 
Court along with a request for provisional measures.34 Similarly to 
the previous case, the judicial institution first considered whether it 
had jurisdiction to order such interim measures,35 indicating that it 
indeed had such jurisdiction for the same reasons as stated above 
(Libya being a state party to the African Charter and the African 
Court Protocol and the competence of the African Commission to 
submit cases to the African Court). Likewise, the judicial institution 
concluded that there was ‘a situation of extreme gravity and urgency, 
31 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Benghazi) v Libya App 4/2011 
15 March 2013 (Order on Merits of the Application), http://en.african-court.
org/images/Cases/Decision/DECISION_-_Application_004-2011_African__
Commission_v_Libya_Struck_outEngl.pdf (accessed 27 April 2020).
32 See part 5. 
33 African Commission (Saif al-Islam Gaddafi) v Libya App 2/2013 15 March 2013 
(Order for Provisional Measures) para 3, http://en.african-court.org/index.
php/55-finalised-cases-details/856-app-no-002-2013-the-african-commission-
on-human-and-peoples-rights-v-libya-detals (accessed 27 April 2020). 
34 Due to the fact that the Libyan state did not comply with the provisional 
measures requested by the African Commission, based on Rule 118(2) of the 
Rules of the Commission, the Commission brought the case before the African 
Court and, in turn, requested the Court to adopt new provisional measures. 
See Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights of 2010 (Rules of the Commission) Rule 118(2), http://www.achpr.org/
instruments/rules-of-procedure-2010/ (accessed 25 April 2020). 
35 In line with its case law, the Court considered that in order to adopt provisional 
measures, ‘it need not satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction on the merits of the 
case, but simply needs to ensure that it has prima facie jurisdiction’. See Order 
for Provisional Measures (n 33) para 10.
(2020) 20 AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW JOURNAL86
as well as a risk of irreparable harm to the detainee’.36 On this basis, 
the African Court unanimously ordered Libya: 
(1) to refrain from all judicial proceedings, investigations or 
detention, that could cause irreparable damage to the detainee, 
in violation of the Charter or any other international instruments 
to which Libya is a party; 
(2) to allow the detainee access to a lawyer of his own choosing; 
(3) to allow the detainee visits by family members; 
(4) to refrain from taking any action that may affect the detainee’s 
physical and mental integrity as well as his health; 
(5) to report to the Court within fifteen days from the date of receipt 
of this Order, on the measures taken to implement this Order. 
Fatsah Ouguergouz J delivered a separate opinion in which he 
concurred with the African Court’s decision of adopting an order for 
provisional measures but remarked that, on procedure, the Court 
seemed to have forgotten that the application should have been 
considered as a request by the African Commission for provisional 
measures. Therefore, in his view the Court did not follow the 
procedure that the Protocol provided for this purpose.37 Moreover, 
according to Ouguergouz J, bearing in mind that two months had 
elapsed between the date of the application and the date of the 
Court’s order, ‘the Court should have therefore requested Libya to 
submit the observations it may have in order for the Court to … 
decide on the basis of the most recent information possible on the 
situation for which provisional measures are sought’.38
Despite an extension of 15 additional days granted by the Court, 
Libya failed to file any response.39 It was not until July 2013 that the 
Court received a note verbale in which Libya adduced no defence but 
advised that an investigation had been opened in Libya against Saif 
al-Islam Gaddafi, and that ‘a Court with jurisdiction’ had authorised 
an extension of his period of pre-trial detention.40 Accordingly, 
the African Court decided to submit to the Assembly, through 
36 Order for Provisional Measures (n 33) para 17.
37 African Commission (Saif al-Islam Gaddafi) v Libya App 2/2013 15 March 2013, 
Separate Opinion of Fatsah Ouguergouz J on Order for Provisional Measures 
para 2, http://en.african-court.org/index.php/55-finalised-cases-details/856-
app-no-002-2013-the-african-commission-on-human-and-peoples-rights-v-
libya-detals (accessed 27 April 2020).
38 Separate Opinion (n 37) para 5.
39 African Commission (Saif al-Islam Gaddafi) v Libya App 2/2013 3 June 2016 
(Judgment on Merits), (2016) 1 AfCLR 153, para 17, http://en.african-court.
org/index.php/55-finalised-cases-details/856-app-no-002-2013-the-african-
commission-on-human-and-peoples-rights-v-libya-detals (accessed 27  April 
2020).
40 As above. 
AFRICAN COURT CASES ON LIBYA FOLLOWING ARAB UPRISINGS 87
the Executive Council, Libya’s non-compliance with its order for 
provisional measures.41 
In May 2014 the Court received a new note verbale in which Libya 
stated that the trial that was taking place in Libya was fair and just, 
and that the Libyan authorities had agreed to invite external observers 
in order to monitor the process. The African Court emphasised that 
the response in the note verbale did not constitute compliance with 
its order.42 Taking into account the continued inadequate responses 
of Libya, in March 2015 the African Commission requested the Court 
to deliver a judgment by default.43 
Events accelerated after July 2015, the month in which it was 
announced that the Assize Court of Tripoli had sentenced Saif al-
Islam Gaddafi to death in absentia.44 As a result, the Court issued a 
new order for provisional measures noting that Libya should ‘take all 
necessary measures to preserve the life of Mr Gaddafi, ensure that 
he is given a fair trial in accordance with internationally recognised 
standards, arrest and prosecute those illegally holding Mr Gaddafi’, 
as well as to submit a report to the Court on the measures taken 
by Libya within 15 days.45 In the absence of an answer from the 
respondent, the Court decided to initiate a proceeding under Rule 
55(1) of the Rules of Court, which provided the legal basis for the 
Court to adopt a judgment by default. 
3.2 Decision on admissibility and merits 
Pursuant to Rule 55(1) of the Rules of the Court, the Court must satisfy 
a three-limb test prior to considering the merits of the matter. It must 
establish (i) ‘that the defaulting party has been duly served with the 
application and all other documents pertinent to the proceedings’; 
(ii) ‘that it has jurisdiction in the case’; and (iii) ‘that the application 
is admissible and well founded in fact and in law’.46 
41 Judgment on Merits (n 39) para 18. In this regard, the Executive Council adopted 
a decision urging Libya ‘to work with the Court and to comply with its Order’. 
42 Judgment on Merits (n 39) para 28.
43 Judgment on Merits para 34. 
44 Saif al-Islam was sentenced in absentia due to the fact that his captors ‘refused 
to release him to the government’s custody citing security issues’. See MJ Ayissi 
‘African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Libya’ (2017) 111 American 
Journal of International Law 740. 
45 Judgment on Merits (n 39) para 17.
46 Rules of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Rules of Court) 55. 
New Rules of Procedure were adopted on 2 June 2010 in order to harmonise the 
Rules of the Court and the Rules of Procedure of the African Commission, http://
www.african-court.org (accessed 27 April 2020).
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With regard to the first limb, the African Court noted that both 
the applicant and court registry had communicated all the pleadings 
to the respondent and consequently that such condition had been 
met.47 As far as the second limb was concerned, the judicial body 
addressed the issue of whether it had material, territorial, temporal 
and personal jurisdiction to hear the case. As far as substantive 
jurisdiction was concerned, the applicant alleged a violation of 
articles 6 and 7 of the African Charter, and argued that the Court 
therefore had jurisdiction.48 Because the alleged violations took place 
in the territory of Libya after it had ratified the African Court Protocol 
and the African Charter, the requirements of territorial and temporal 
jurisdiction had been satisfied.49 
As for its personal jurisdiction, the Court noted that the African 
Commission was one of the entities entitled to submit cases to the 
Court as provided for in article 5(1) of the Court Protocol. With regard 
to the respondent, the judicial institution again recalled that Libya 
had ratified both the Court Protocol and the African Charter and 
held that, despite the detention of Saif Gaddafi by a ‘revolutionary 
brigade’, based on the Draft Articles of the International Law 
Commission on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, ‘the respondent is responsible for the latter’s action as 
well as its acts of omission … the State is indeed under the obligation 
to take measures to ensure, in its territory, the application of the laws 
guaranteed under the Charter’.50 
As far as the third limb was concerned, that of admissibility, the 
Court addressed the issue of exhaustion of local remedies. In this 
regard the Court considered that it was evident from the facts that 
Saif Gaddafi had been detained in an unknown location without 
access to a lawyer and sentenced to death in absentia, with the result 
that he could not have had access to effective, sufficient and available 
local remedies.51 As for the reasonable time requirement, the Court 
regarded as ‘reasonable’ the period of just over one year between 
47 Judgment on Merits (n 39) paras 41-43. 
48 Judgment on Merits paras 53-54. 
49 Judgment on Merits paras 55-60.
50 Judgment on Merits paras 47-52. In support of its view the Court cited art 9 of 
the Draft Articles of the Internal Law Commission on the Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts which provides that ‘the conduct of a person or 
group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if 
the person or group of persons is in fact exercising elements of the governmental 
authority in the absence or default of the official authorities and in circumstances 
such as to call for the exercise of those elements of authority’.
51 Judgment on Merits (n 39) paras 66-70.
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the conclusion that Libya had not complied with the provisional 
measures requested and the submission of the application.52 
After having considered the requirements of jurisdiction and 
admissibility, the Court turned to examine the merits of the matter. 
In this regard, the Court first addressed the issue of derogation of 
rights, noting that 
whereas it is accepted under international law that, in exceptional 
circumstances, States Parties to a human rights instrument have the 
right of derogation therefrom, it is no less recognised that … there 
are rights that cannot be derogated, regardless of the prevailing 
situation.53 
Among them, in the Court’s view, these are the rights enshrined in 
articles 6 and 7 of the African Charter. Thus, the Court held that, 
in spite of the exceptional situation that had since 2011 prevailed 
in Libya, ‘the Libyan State is internationally responsible for ensuring 
compliance with and guaranteeing such rights’.54 
As far as article 6 of the African Charter is concerned, the Court, in 
line with its case law, noted that ‘deprivation of liberty is permitted 
only when it is in conformity with procedures established by domestic 
legislation which itself should be consistent with international human 
rights standards’. In this context, the Court referred to article 9 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and 
to the jurisprudence of the UN Human Rights Committee on this 
matter, according to which ‘arrest and detention incommunicado 
for seven days and the restrictions on the exercise of the right of 
habeas corpus constitute a violation of article 9 of the Covenant as a 
whole’.55 Likewise, in line with the arguments relied on by the African 
Commission as applicant, the Court noted that the incommunicado 
detention could lead to other violations such as ill-treatment and 
torture.56 On the basis of the foregoing, the Court concluded that 
the detention of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi since November 2011 without 
access to a lawyer constituted a violation of his right to personal 
liberty, protection from arbitrary arrest and security of his person as 
set forth in article 6 of the African Charter.57 
52 Judgment on Merits paras 71-73. According to Rule 40(6) of the Rules of Court 
‘applications to the Court shall be filed within a reasonable time from the date 
local remedies were exhausted or from the date set by the Court as being the 
commencement of the time limit within which it shall be seized with the matter’. 
53 Judgment on Merits (n 39) paras 76-77. Regarding this matter, as an example, 
the Court referred to art 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. 
54 Judgment on Merits (n 39) para 77. 
55 Judgment on Merits para 84.
56 As above. 
57 Judgment on Merits (n 39) para 85.
(2020) 20 AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW JOURNAL90
With regard to article 7 of the Charter, the Court stressed that the 
right to a fair trial was a ‘fundamental human right’ recognised in all 
human rights treaties,58 and ‘implied that every individual accused 
of a crime or an offence shall receive all the guarantees under the 
procedure and afforded the right of defence’.59 Saif al-Islam Gaddafi 
was detained incommunicado in a secret location without access 
to either his family or to a lawyer or any form of representation, 
arraigned before an extraordinary court called ‘the People’s Tribunal’ 
– which was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court 
of Libya – and then sentenced to death in absentia by the Tripoli 
Court of Azzize. Consequently, the Court concluded that the Libyan 
state had violated and continued to violate articles 6 and 7 of the 
African Charter, and ordered Libya ‘to terminating the illegal criminal 
procedure instituted before the domestic courts’ as well as ‘to submit 
to the Court a report on the measures taken to guarantee the rights 
of Mr Gaddafi within sixty days from the date of notification of this 
judgment’.60 
In a separate opinion, Ouguergouz J concurred that Libya had 
violated articles 6 and 7 of the African Charter, but argued that, 
first, the Court had failed to verify that the application was well 
founded in fact, and that, second, it should have analysed more 
thoroughly some legal issues. With regard to the former, according 
to Ouguergouz J, in his separate opinion, the Court ‘seems to have 
purely and simply endorsed the Applicant’s submissions, and by so 
doing, apparently pronounced itself automatically in favour of the 
Applicant, which is precisely what the prescriptions of Rule 55 of 
the Rules of the Court intended to avoid’.61 As for the latter, in his 
view the Court should have placed the emphasis on the issue of 
derogation of rights in other international and regional human rights 
instruments applicable to the case, as well as on the obligations that 
article 1 of the African Charter imposes on those states that have 
ratified the treaty.62 
58 As an example, the Court cited art 14 of ICCPR as well as the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights. Judgment on Merits (n 39) paras 89 & 95. 
59 Judgment on Merits (n 39) para 89.
60 Judgment on Merits para 97. 
61 Separate Opinion of Ouguergouz J on Admissibility of the Application 3 June 2016, 
para 28, http://en.african-court.org/index.php/55-finalised-cases-details/856- 
app-no-002-2013-the-african-commission-on-human-and-peoples-rights-v-
libya-detals (accessed 27 April 2020).
62 Separate Opinion (n 61) paras 3-14. 
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4 Lights and shadows of the Court’s decisions
The two decisions under discussion are noteworthy in several 
respects. These cases are of particular interest since the African 
Commission for the first time transferred a case to the African Court, 
and the Court granted its first orders for provisional measures and 
rendered its first judgment by default. These cases also illustrate the 
route by which individuals and NGOs with observer status before 
the African Commission may submit an application to the Court – 
indirectly, by the Commission transferring a matter submitted to it 
to the Court. Since Libya has not made the special declaration under 
article 34(6) of the Court Protocol allowing the Court to receive 
applications directly from individuals and NGOs,63 direct access to 
the Court was not a possibility. Moreover, both cases demonstrate 
the importance of local and international NGOs in collecting 
evidence and persuading the African institutions to protect human 
rights. In this regard, it is also worth mentioning the accommodating 
approach adopted by the Court allowing the Pan African Lawyers’ 
Union (PALU) to participate as amicus curiae in the case of African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Benghazi) v Libya. It is 
of considerable relevance because, as Viljoen points out, access to 
amici curiae ‘enhances the quality of a court’s judgments and serves 
to make the court proceedings more democratically legitimate’.64 
These elements together with additional legal and procedural issues 
are considered separately in the following parts.
4.1 The exceptional dynamism between the African 
Commission and the African Court
Both the Commission and the Court appeared notably dynamic in 
the cases where, as noted above, for the first time the Commission 
transferred a case to the Court and the Court propio motu granted 
its first orders for provisional measures. In the same way, the 
effort of both institutions to encourage Libya to comply with the 
decisions should be noted. Regarding the issuance of provisional 
measures, the Court strongly relied on the evidence of human rights 
violations gathered by NGOs, which initially were submitted to the 
63 See O Windridge ‘In default: African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
v Libya’ The ACtHPR Monitor, August 2016, http://www.acthprmonitor.org/in-
default-african-commission-on-human-and-peoples-rights-v-libya/ (accessed 
3 May 2020).
64 F Viljoen ‘Understanding and overcoming challenges in accessing the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2018) 67 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 95.
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Commission.65 In particular, the senior legal adviser of the Egyptian 
Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) affirmed that ‘[t]his is an important 
development within the African human rights system, demonstrating 
how the African Commission and Court can cooperate in taking action 
against massive human rights violations’.66 In particular, the case of 
the African Commission (Saif Al-Islam Kadhafi) v Libya exemplifies 
indirect access to the Court through the referral by the Commission 
of unimplemented provisional measures. As indicated by Viljoen, this 
indirect access would require two cumulative elements: the non-
compliance by the respondent state; and the referral of the case by 
the Commission at its discretion.67 This possibility has been explicitly 
contemplated in Rule 118(2) of the 2010 Rules of Procedure of the 
African Commission.68 Since then, there has been only one additional 
decision that made use of this provision: the African Commission 
(Ogiek) v Kenya case.69
The decision in African Commission (Saif Al-Islam Kadhafi) v Libya 
also represents the first time the Court rendered a judgment by 
default. In arguing in favour of the application of Rule 55 of the 
Rules of the Court regarding judgments by default, the decision 
emphasised the continuous attempts made by both the Commission 
and the Court to compel Libya to comply or get involved in the case. 
In this regard, according to Ayissi, the Court’s decision reflected ‘both 
a measured approach to the issuance of default judgments and an 
emphasis on the need for states to comply with their human rights 
obligations even in situations of exceptional political and security 
instability’.70 This decision opens the door for potential judgments by 
default in cases where the respondent state fails to become engaged 
in the procedure. Taking into consideration the growing number of 
applications received by the African Court, the possibility of future 
judgments by default will also increase, although it needs to be noted 
that ‘a case going to judgment in default does not automatically 
result in a decision in favour of the applicant’.71
65 See A Dolidze ‘African Court on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights – Response 
to the situation in Libya’ (2011) 15 Insights American Society of International Law, 
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/15/issue/20/african-court-human-and-
peoples’-rights-–-response-situation-libya (accessed 10 April 2020). 
66 Human Rights Watch ‘Libya: African Rights Court issues first ruling against a 
state’ 30  March 2011, https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/30/libya-african-
rights-court-issues-first-ruling-against-state (accessed 4 May 2020). 
67 Viljoen (n 64) 75. 
68 See Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, approved by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
during its 47th ordinary session held in Banjul, The Gambia, 12-26 May 2010.
69 African Commission (Ogiek) v Kenya App 6/2012, Order for Provisional Measures 
15 March 2013.
70 Ayissi (n 44) 738.
71 O Windridge ‘In default: African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v 
Libya’ (2018) 18 African Human Rights Law Journal 774. 
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Nevertheless, these cases also highlight the fact that greater 
clarity is needed in the relationship between the African Court and 
the African Commission. For instance, in the African Commission (Saif 
al-Islam Gaddafi) v Libya case the Court appeared to ignore that it 
was the Commission that decided to issue an order for provisional 
measures in the first place, which was not complied with by the 
Libyan state72 and, thus, decided to submit the case to the Court. In 
so doing, the Court failed to follow the proceeding provided for in 
Rule 51 of the Rules of Court.73 Furthermore, as noted by Windridge, 
the current Commission-then-Court scenario also creates the seemingly 
confusing situation whereby the ‘Applicant’ is the Commission rather 
than Gaddafi … This raises practical issues moving forward with similar 
transferred cases. Is the Commission ‘acting’ for the complainant? 
Does the Commission ‘represent’ the complainant, or do they in effect 
step away from litigating the case once they have transferred it?74 
Another point to consider when examining the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Benghazi) v Libya decision is that the 
legal basis for transferring the case was not specified either by the 
Commission or by the Court. In this case, the legal basis appears 
to be Rule 118(3) of the 2010 Rules of Procedure of the African 
Commission. This question is of great relevance for the proceedings 
and should be specified in the decision, especially since the situation 
constitutes one of serious and massive violations of human rights.75 
The need for clarity is all the more pertinent because the four scenarios 
provided for in Rule 118 (in particular Rule 118(4) and its relationship 
with the other aspects of Rule 118) are not particularly clear and 
require further interpretation. In the same vein, the Court in neither 
case checked the veracity of the facts detailed in the Commission’s 
applications,76 and did not satisfy the jura novit curia principle,77 
which led Ouguergouz J to hold in a separate judgment that the 
Court had failed to ensure that the applications were well founded 
in fact and in law.78 This issue is also discussed in the following part. 
72 Separate Opinion of Fatsah Ouguergouz J on Order for Provisional Measures 
para 2; Order for Provisional Measures (n 33) para 2, in relation with Rule 118.2 
Rules of Procedure of the African Commission.
73 See Windridge (n 71). 
74 Windridge (n 71).
75 Order for Provisional Measures (n 19) 2.
76 One of the negative consequences of this situation is the fact that the information 
on which the Court based its decisions clearly was not updated. 
77 As stated by the International Court of Justice in the case of Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of 
America) ICJ 27 June 1986 (Decisions on Merits) para 29, ‘the jura novit curia 
principle signifies that, to decide whether submissions are founded in law, the 
Court is not solely dependent on the arguments of the parties before it with 
respect to the applicable law’. 
78 Separate Opinion of Ouguergouz J on Admissibility of the Application (n 61) 
paras 4-6 & 16-31. .
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4.2 Lack of application of Rules 45 and 46 by the Court
Another procedural aspect to be examined was the fact that the 
Court did not apply Rules 45 (Measures for Taking Evidence) and 
46 (Witnesses, Experts and Other Persons) of the Rules of Court, 
especially regarding the first case, with a view to compelling the AU 
Assembly and the PSC to adopt a more active role in the Libyan crisis. 
Perez-Leon Acevedo maintains the view that the fact-finding powers 
of the African Commission and the Court should not be constrained 
by the political decisions taken by the AU Assembly.79 In particular, 
he states that the African Commission only implemented limited 
fact-finding capacities regarding the atrocities committed in Libya in 
comparison to the work performed by UN mechanisms, such as the 
International Commission of Inquiry into Libya.80 
In this sense, the fact-finding powers of the African Court 
could have been reinforced if it had made use of the mechanisms 
provided for in Rules 45 and 46. These mechanisms allow the 
Court to obtain any evidence that may provide clarification of the 
facts of the case, including hearing the declarations of witnesses, 
experts or other relevant persons. Moreover, it is argued that the 
fact-finding powers of the African Commission and the Court would 
have been of paramount importance in the process of informing 
the AU Assembly and the PSC in the case of authorising a military 
intervention. Strengthening these procedural capacities could have 
led to increasing evidence in order to make these institutions react 
and engage in the Libyan crisis. 
4.3 Use of additional human rights instruments by the African 
Court
Turning to the violations of the African Charter, the African Court 
adopted a comprehensive approach to the right to a fair trial, 
holding that such right includes the right to be promptly ‘arraigned 
before a judicial authority’;81 the right to ‘be notified of the trial date 
and of the charges levelled against the accused’;82 the right to ‘be 
assisted by a lawyer of his/her own choosing’;83 and the right to 
‘communicate with his/her counsel and have adequate time and 
facilities to prepare the defence’.84 However, the Court seemed to 
79 Perez-Leon Acevedo (n 16) 498.
80 Perez-Leon Acevedo 495. 
81 Judgment on Merits (n 39) para 91.
82 Judgment on Merits para 94. 
83 Judgment on Merits para 93. 
84 Judgment on Merits para 94. 
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forget that, according to article 3 (Jurisdiction) and article 7 (Sources 
of Law) of the Court Protocol, it is entitled to apply any other relevant 
human rights instruments ratified by Libya, not only for the purposes 
of interpretation of the corresponding articles of the African Charter, 
but also, as noted by Ouguergouz J, with the same legal force as the 
African Charter and its Protocols.85 
Accordingly, the Court should have carried out a more detailed 
analysis of the violations of articles 6 and 7 of the African Charter 
referring to other relevant human rights instruments. In this regard, 
in the African Commission (Saif al-Islam Gaddafi) v Libya case the Court 
referred to articles 9 and 14 of ICCPR, but it would also have been 
useful to refer, for instance, to article 2(3) (the right to an effective 
remedy) and article 6 (the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of 
one’s life’) of ICCPR. It could also, as interpretive guide, have drawn 
more from the 1988 Principles for the Protection of All Persons 
Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment in connection with 
the case in question. Furthermore, the African Commission also in 
2003 adopted the Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair 
Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa which further developed articles 
5, 6, 7 and 26 of the African Charter.86 The decision of the African 
Court could have been more coherent and consistent if the African 
Commission’s Principles had been quoted by the Court bringing 
together international and regional human rights instruments in its 
argumentation. 
With regard to the issue of derogation, and taking into account 
the situation of non-international armed conflict in Libya since 
2011,87 it is to be welcomed that, despite the lack of any article in the 
African Charter regarding derogation in times of public emergency, 
the Court referred to article 4 of ICCPR.88 The Court only briefly 
85 Separate Opinion of Ouguergouz J on Admissibility of the Application (n 61) 
para 8. 
86 Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in 
Africa adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 
May 2003 in Niamey, Niger.
87 In this regard, see eg I Fuente Cobo ‘Libia, la guerra del General Jalifa Haftar’ 
(2017) 70 Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos 1.
88 Art 4 of ICCPR provides that ‘(1) In time of public emergency which threatens 
the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the 
States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from their 
obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with 
their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination 
solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin. 
(2) No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs I and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 
may be made under this provision. (3) Any State Party to the present Covenant 
availing itself of the right of derogation shall immediately inform the other States 
Parties to the present Covenant, through the intermediary of the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, of the provisions from which it has derogated 
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mentioned the application of this article indicating that the right 
of derogation of state parties ‘has inherent limits in so far as there 
are rights that cannot be derogated, regardless of the prevailing 
situation’.89 Nevertheless, it did not further elaborate on those limits 
or other key issues regarding the application of this article, such as 
the procedural and substantive elements. This was also noted by 
Ayissi, who explains:90
The Court missed an opportunity to expand on its reasoning on the 
issue. It could, for instance, have examined whether the procedural 
and substantive requirements of ICCPR Article 4 had been met in 
the case at hand, in light of the Human Rights Committee’s General 
Comment No 29 (2001). It could also have explained how the non-
derogability principle applies to Articles 6 and 7 of the African Charter.
On a positive note, it is worth noting that the Court referred to the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in relation to 
the right to be assisted by a lawyer as derived from article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.91 In particular, the Court 
mentioned the cases of Brusco v France and Dayanan v Turkey.92 This 
demonstrates the importance of the so-called ‘dialogue’ between 
international and regional courts in the interpretation of human 
rights provisions.93 
4.4 International responsibility of the Libyan state
In African Commission (Saif al-Islam Gaddafi) v Libya the African 
Court stressed the international responsibility of the Libyan state for 
ensuring compliance with articles 6 and 7 of the African Charter with 
respect to the conduct of a ‘revolutionary brigade’. As argued by 
Windridge, ‘the Court forestalled future attempts by member states 
to disavow actions of groups it claims are not under its control but 
operating on in its territory … thereby dismissing any arguments by 
member states that ‘we can’t do anything about it’.94 Nonetheless, 
since it was the first time that this issue was addressed by the Court, 
this was an opportunity for the Court to thoroughly examine the 
cases in which the state is responsible for acts committed by a person 
and of the reasons by which it was actuated. A further communication shall be 
made, through the same intermediary, on the date on which it terminates such 
derogation.’
89 Judgment on Merits (n 39) para 76.
90 Ayissi (n 44) 743. 
91 Judgment on Merits (n 39) para 95.
92 See European Court of Human Rights Brusco v France, 14 October 2010; 
European Court of Human Rights, Dayanan v Turkey, 13 October 2009. 
93 See FJ Ansuátegui Roig ‘Human rights and judicial dialogue between America 
and Europe: Toward a new model of law? (2016) 6 The Age of Human Rights 
Journal 24.
94 Windridge (n 71).
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or group of persons. In particular, although the Court referred to 
article 9 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, it did not examine the three conditions 
that must be met for conduct to be considered directly imputable to 
the state.95 Article 9 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts establishes three conditions that 
must be met in order for conduct to be attributable to the state: 
First, the conduct must effectively relate to the exercise of elements 
of the governmental authority; second, the conduct must have 
been carried out in the absence or default of the official authorities; 
and third, the circumstances must have been such as to call for the 
exercise of those elements of authority.96 These conditions were not 
specifically evaluated by the Court in the current case. 
It is also worth mentioning that, in contrast to what the Court 
did, in his separate opinion Ouguergouz J highlighted the detailed 
analysis carried out in the Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras case by 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in addressing the topic of 
the international responsibility of states and linking it with the due 
diligence principle.97 In this case the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights held: 98
An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not 
directly imputable to a state (for example, because it is the act of 
a private person or because the person responsible has not been 
identified) can lead to international responsibility of the state, not 
because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to 
prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the Convention.
This means that the international responsibility of a state can be 
triggered not only for its own violation of international obligations 
but for its lack of due diligence in preventing, responding or 
investigating such violation committed in its territory by a private 
person or a group of persons. As a consequence, the African Court 
should have offered a more solid argumentation regarding the due 
diligence obligations of the Libyan state. On this particular aspect, 
the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
and the European Court of Human Rights could serve as valuable 
interpretative materials for the African Court. 
95 Judgment on Merits (n 39) para 50. 
96 See art 9 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries (2001) adopted by the International Law 
Commission at its 53rd session; Yearbook of the International Law Commission 
(2001) Vol II, Part II 49.
97 Separate Opinion of Ouguergouz J on Admissibility of the Application (n 61) 
para 12 fn 17. 
98 See Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras IACHR 29 July 1988 (Judgment) para 72. 
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4.5 Political will of the African Union policy organs
Finally, it needs to be pointed out that the outcome of these cases 
has been subordinated to the political decisions of the AU policy 
organs and the existing divisions among its member states. As 
stated by Sander, ‘the efficacy of any order of the Court is ultimately 
dependent on the political will of the African Union’.99 In fact, 
there is no independent body in charge of the enforcement of the 
Court’s orders. According to article 31 of the Court Protocol, these 
enforcement powers specifically rely on active engagement by the 
AU Executive Council. 
In the aforementioned cases there were strong divisions among 
AU member states in relation to the decision as to how to deal with 
the Libyan crisis, particularly between the group led by Nigeria and 
that led by South Africa and Zimbabwe. According to Ekwealor and 
Okeke-Uzodike, 
while Nigeria’s position on the regime in Libya, that includes 
the formation of a new inclusive government which allows for 
the participation of the Transitional National Council (TNC), was 
supported by another 34 African States, South Africa and Zimbabwe 
were adamant that Gaddafi should remain at the helm.100 
Due to this lack of agreement, the AU not only failed to implement a 
common agenda but also to protect human rights in such a pressing 
situation. Consequently, these cases show that the potential positive 
impact of the African Court in cases of imminent human rights 
violations can be undermined by the political divisions within the AU. 
5 Moving forward: Lessons learned and 
recommendations for the future work of the 
Court
The two cases analysed above are for several reasons considered 
of paramount importance for the consolidation and legitimation 
of the African Court. As was explained in the introduction, for the 
purposes of this article ‘consolidation’ means the consistency and 
effectiveness of the Court in delivering judgments. ‘Legitimation’ 
here refers to the perceived legitimacy by relevant constituencies 
(empirical legitimacy) and the justified authority in terms of law or 
99 B Sander ‘Case summary, Application 004/2011 African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights v The Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’ 4 January 
2012, http://arcproject.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/CSW-004-2011.
pdf (accessed 4 May 2018). 
100 See Ekwealor & Okeke-Uzodike (n 14) 76.
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expertise (normative legitimacy). In terms of its consolidation, the 
Court acted in an effective way because, for the first time, it made 
use of important procedural mechanisms at its disposal in cases of 
extreme gravity and massive violations of human rights, namely, the 
issuance of provisional measures and the adoption of a judgment by 
default. Moreover, these cases represent the only cases that have to 
date been heard by the Court concerning Arab African countries.101 
These cases have opened the door for the future use of these 
procedural mechanisms. Since then the Court has issued 39 additional 
orders for provisional measures in very different circumstances, the 
last being on 22 April 2020 against Côte d’Ivoire.102 The Libyan 
decisions have been quoted subsequently by the Court with 
regard to the fact that the Court does not need to justify that it 
has jurisdiction on the merits of the case when ordering provisional 
measures.103 As for the possibility of rendering judgments by default, 
the Court also set a legal precedent that could be applied to similar 
cases where the respondent fails to appear or defend its case. In the 
matter concerning Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, the Court considered that 
notwithstanding the fact that the respondent sent two notes verbale, 
it ‘consistently failed to present its defence, despite the extension of 
the deadline accorded’.104 Therefore, notes verbale do not necessarily 
in themselves serve the purpose of demonstrating adequate state 
engaging in the implementation process. 
In terms of the legitimation of the African Court, NGOs and 
international lawyers applauded the decision in African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (Benghazi) v Libya for being the first ruling 
against a state considering the situation of exceptional insecurity 
in Libya.105 The Court stressed the international responsibility of 
the Libyan state for failing to comply with articles 6 and 7 of the 
African Charter. In addition, as far as its justified legal argumentation, 
particularly in relation to the African Commission (Saif al-Islam 
Gaddafi) v Libya case, is concerned, the decision was regarded as 
101 Largely because among them only Tunisia has recently signed the declaration 
under art 34(6) of the African Court Protocol. 
102 See the list of cases where provisional orders have been issued at https://en.african-
court.org/index.php/59-list-of-cases-with-provisional-measures/1037-list-
of-cases-where-orders-for-provisional-measures-have-been-issued (accessed 
10 April 2020).
103 Eg, see Armand Guehi v United Republic of Tanzania 18 March 2016 3; Dexter 
Eddie Johnson v Republic of Ghana 28 September 2017 4; Sébastien Germain 
Ajavon v Republic of Benin 5 December 2018 6. 
104 Judgment on Merits (n 39) para 42. 
105 See International Federation for Human Rights ‘The African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights seized of a case against Libya’ 15 April 2011, https://www.
fidh.org/en/region/north-africa-middle-east/libya/9527-the-african-court-on-
human-and-peoples-rights-seized-of-a-case-against; see also Human Rights 
Watch (n 66).
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‘solid jurisprudence’ for potential submissions by AU member states 
that may in extreme circumstances derogate the right to a fair trial 
or the right to liberty.106 
Nonetheless, following these decisions a number of 
recommendations for the better functioning of the Court are 
suggested, both at the procedural and the substantive level. First, 
the article argues that more clarity is needed in respect of the 
relationship between the African Court and the African Commission, 
especially when a case is or can potentially be transferred to the 
African Court. In particular, it is not clear how the four scenarios 
provided for in the Commission’s 2010 Rules of Procedure (in Rule 
118) should be applied and whether the Commission is ‘acting’ or 
‘representing’ the complainant.107 Moreover, the Court is required 
to investigate the veracity of the facts detailed in the Commission’s 
applications and when necessary update them. Second, and in the 
same vein, the Court should make use of all the procedural tools 
at its disposal when investigating serious and massive violations of 
human rights, for instance, bringing into play Rules 45 and 46 of the 
Rules of the Court and hearing witnesses and other experts in the 
field.108 In this way, facts will be supported with stronger and more 
consistent evidence. 
At the substantive level of the examination of the merits of the 
case, it is argued that the Court should use additional UN and AU 
instruments in the interpretation of human rights provisions.109 
Although the Court considered ICCPR as one of the legal bases for 
the interpretation of the right to liberty and the right to a fair trial, it 
neither further elaborated on the 1988 Principles for the Protection 
of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, nor did 
it cite the 2003 African Commission Principles and Guidelines on the 
Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa. Bringing together 
additional international human rights instruments could lead to a 
richer and more detailed analysis of the alleged violations. Finally, 
when deciding about key legal issues that have never been examined 
by the African Court, it is recommended that the Court explore the 
jurisprudence of other regional human rights courts, such as the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights or the European Court of 
Human Rights.110 For example, topics such as the issue of derogation 
of rights or the due diligence principle for state responsibility have 
106 Windridge (n 71) 772.
107 See part 4.1 of this article. 
108 See part 4.2 of this article.
109 See part 4.3 of this article. 
110 See part 4.4 of this article. 
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been extensively discussed by these courts.111 In this regard, it is to be 
welcomed that since these two judgments the African Court indeed 
has included more references to the case law of these tribunals in its 
decisions.112
6 Concluding remarks
Libya ratified the African Charter in 1986 and the African Court 
Protocol in 2003.113 However, it has not made the declaration allowing 
individuals and NGOs to directly access the Court. Despite the lack 
of direct access by individuals and NGOs, the above cases reached 
the African Court. This was only possible through the referral of the 
decisions by the African Commission, establishing an alternative route 
to the Court. This indirect access could have relevant significance 
in the future due to the withdrawals of four states of their special 
declarations allowing direct access to the Court.114 Remarkably, since 
the African Commission (Ogiek) v Kenya case, this indirect access route 
has not again been taken. Clearly, a higher level of activity by the 
African Commission is required to properly assess whether this path 
actually proves effective. 
As explained in this article, these decisions have been essential for 
the consolidation and legitimation of the African Court, representing 
the first decisions in condemning an AU member state, the first 
adoption of provisional measures and the first judgment by default. 
Nonetheless, both cases also reflect that certain areas urgently need 
to be improved. In particular, some procedural and legal issues 
should have been examined in greater detail by the Court so as to 
offer a more consistent and elaborate argumentation. An even more 
serious concern is the fact that none of the decisions adopted by the 
Court has been enforced by the relevant AU institutions. Therefore, 
111 Regarding the derogation of rights, see J Allain ‘Derogations from the European 
Convention of Human Rights in light of other obligations under international 
law’ (2005) 11 European Human Rights Law Review 480. On the due diligence 
principle and state responsibility, see JM Pasqualucci The practice and procedure 
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (2013) 184-187. 
112 Eg, see Actions pour la Protection des Droits de l’Homme (APDH) v Côte d’Ivoire 
18 November 2016 paras 64, 95, 134 & 148. 
113 See Ratification Table of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
https://www.achpr.org/ratificationtable?id=49; Ratification List of the Court’s 
Protocol, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36393-sl-protocol_to_the_
african_charter_on_human_and_peoplesrights_on_the_estab.pdf (accessed 
20 May 2020).
114 See T Davi & E Amani ‘Another one bites the dust: Côte d’Ivoire to end individual 
and NGO access to the African Court’ EJIL:Talk! Blog of the European Journal of 
International Law 19 May 2020, https://www.ejiltalk.org/another-one-bites-the-
dust-cote-divoire-to-end-individual-and-ngo-access-to-the-african-court/?fbcli
d=IwAR3ZTiOoYtiybJz-_WJGs24dYtDFvvspqRrS0WAMYyNtPVhNciQvoAybPFQ 
(accessed 20 May 2020).
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the AU not only failed to implement a common agenda but also to 
protect human rights in such a pressing situation. The AU must leave 
behind the current political rhetoric and bear in mind that one of its 
main goals is to promote, protect and guarantee human rights under 
a just rule of law, as provided for in article 3 of the AU’s Constitutive 
Act.115 Only under these conditions is the end to impunity ever to be 
achieved.
115 Constitutive Act of the African Union adopted on 11 July 2003 at Lomé, Togo. 
